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WHOSE IS THE POWER? THE CASE OF THE CURSING CHEERLEADER:
MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT V. B.L.
Lisa Smith Butler*
Abstract
This article explores the free speech rights of students in the public school setting while
off-campus in the recently decided Supreme Court of the United States case of Mahanoy Area
School District v. B.L. It examines the history of school discipline from the American colonial
period to the present, and briefly explores the First Amendment doctrine regarding content
regulation. Next, it reviews the line of Supreme Court decisions from Tinker onwards regarding
students’ First Amendment rights in the public school setting and then studies decisions from
circuit courts. It then considers the various rules proposed by all of the litigants before the Court,
including the acting Solicitor General in Mahanoy. It selects the most feasible rule and applies it
to the facts of the case.
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Introduction
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.: The Facts
“Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything,” began B.L.’s rant against life on a
Saturday afternoon with a high school friend.1
B.L. was a rising sophomore at Mahanoy High School in Mahanoy, Pennsylvania.2 During
her freshman year, she was a cheerleader on the school’s junior varsity team.3 She tried out for a
position on the school’s varsity cheer team at the end of her freshman year but failed to make the
team.4 Instead, B.L. was again relegated to the junior varsity cheer squad; even more upsetting to
B.L. was learning that an incoming freshman made the varsity cheer squad without being required
to spend a year on the junior varsity cheer squad.5 B.L. was “visibly upset” when the cheer coaches
announced the results.6
Disappointed in the cheerleading squad results and the softball team selections, B.L. was
unhappy with cheerleading, softball, school, and life in general on Saturday, May 28, 2017.7 She
went to the local convenience store, the Cocoa Hut, with a friend from school.8 While there, B.L.
expressed her frustration with school, cheerleading, softball, and life.9 B.L. took a selfie of herself
and her friend, with middle fingers thrust forward, and then added the following text to the photo:
“fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”10 B.L. posted the photo to her Snapchat
account which was shared with 250 of her “friends.”11 Included within the 250 friends were
members of the cheerleading squad and classmates at Mahanoy High School.12 One of B.L.’s
classmates took a screenshot of B.L.’s posts and shared it with the cheerleading squad.13 One of
the cheerleaders then shared the screenshot with her mother who was also a cheer coach.14 From
there, many people viewed the posts.15

1

J.A. at 40-41, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (No. 20-255).
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2021).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 610 (M.D. Pa. 2017). This is the first opinion from the Middle
District of Pennsylvania which granted B.L. a preliminary injunction.
8
Id.
9
J.A., supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2043 (The Court described Snapchat as “…a social media application that
allows users to post photos and videos that disappear after a set period of time.”).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See J.A., supra note 1, at 31-35. Nicole Luchetta Rump testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that she was
both a cheer coach and an algebra teacher. She said that students approached her throughout the week after B.L.’s post
to talk about it. Luchetta-Rump said that she received a copy of the post from April Gnall the second cheer coach.
April stated in her October 20, 2018, deposition that her daughter, also a cheerleader, shared the post with her. Id. at
90-91.
15
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
2
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As teachers and students returned to school on Monday, the cheer coaches reported that
several cheerleaders and other students approached them, obviously, upset about B.L.’s posts.16 A
brief discussion about the posts ensued in Ms. Luchetta-Rump’s math class.17
Coaches Luchetta-Rump and Gnall conferred and concluded that B.L. had violated the
Respect and Negative Information rules of the cheerleading rule book that B.L. had signed when
she joined the junior varsity cheerleading squad.18 They decided to suspend B.L. from the
cheerleading squad for a year for her behavior.19
B.L.’s apologies and attempts at reinstatement were unsuccessful, so she filed suit in
September 2017, alleging that the school’s punishment20 violated her First Amendment21 rights.
B.L. requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction.22 As initially
posed, the issue before the United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania in
September 2017 was whether B.L. was likely to prevail in her motions for a TRO and preliminary
injunction.23 As the court reviewed the injunction factors24 and applied them to the facts, it
concluded that B.L. was likely to prevail so it granted her a TRO.25 On October 5, 2017, the district
court then granted B.L.’s preliminary injunction.26
As both parties prepared for trial, B.L.’s attorney framed the issue as:
Whether the Mahanoy Area School District violated the plaintiff's First
Amendment rights when it suspended her, a cheerleader, from the cheerleading
squad because of a Snap Chat post that said “fuck cheer fuck softball fuck school
fuck everything” which B.L. created and shared with her friends on a weekend,
while off-campus, using her personal phone while she was not participating in any
school activities.27
In response, the school district framed the issues confronting the Court as four.28 They were:

16

J.A., supra note 1, at 31, 91.
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 443-444 (M.D. Pa. 2019). This is the second opinion
published by the Middle District of Pennsylvania in this case. In it, B.L. was granted her Motion for a Summary
Judgment against the school, Mahanoy Area School District. The Court concluded that the school had violated B.L.’s
First Amendment rights with the discipline of her speech.
18
Id. at 433. See also J.A., supra note 1, at 16-18.
19
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 610-11.
20
Id.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. I. B.L. also raised other constitutional issues at this time, including whether she voluntarily
waived her First Amendment rights when she signed the Cheer Rule, whether such a right could be voluntarily waived,
and whether the rules were void for vagueness. These issues will not be addressed in this article.
22
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 611-12.
23
Id. at 611-13.
24
Id. The district court noted that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the
balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
25
Id. at 616.
26
Id.
27
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff B.L’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, B.L. v. Mahanoy Area
School District, 376 F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2019), 2018 WL 11273467.
28
Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment at 3-4, B.L. v. Mahanoy Area
School District, 376 F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2019), 2018 WL 8059444.
17
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1. Is a school district permitted to suspend a student from a voluntary
extracurricular activity for conduct that admittedly violates agreed-upon
rules and that is contrary to the educational mission of the extracurricular
activity under the First Amendment analysis in Tinker? Suggested answer:
Yes.
2. Does a school district violate the First Amendment by removing a student
from an extracurricular team for using profanity about the extracurricular
activity? Suggested answer: No.
3. Do the Mahanoy Area High School Cheerleading Rules violate the First
Amendment? Suggested answer: No.
4. Do the Mahanoy Area High School Cheerleading Rules violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Suggested answer: No.29
The district court granted B.L.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that “[c]oaches
cannot punish students for what they say off the field if that speech fails to satisfy the Tinker or
Kuhlmeier standards…. Even then, whether Tinker applies to speech uttered beyond the
schoolhouse gate is an open question ….”30
The school district then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit.31 Writing for the majority, Judge Cheryl Ann Krause noted that the appeal required the
court to answer only two questions: “The first is whether B.L.’s snap was protected speech. If it
was not, our inquiry is at an end. But if it was, we must then decide whether B.L. waived that
protection.”32 The majority affirmed the decision for B.L., holding that “Tinker does not apply to
off-campus speech—that is, speech that is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised
channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing a school’s imprimatur.”33 While Judge
Thomas L. Ambro concurred with the judgment, he dissented34 from the majority's holding that
Tinker “does not apply to off-campus speech.” Judge Ambro noted that “ours is the first Circuit
Court to hold that Tinker categorically does not apply to off-campus speech. A few circuits have
flirted with such a holding and have declined to apply Tinker to off-campus speech on a case-bycase basis.”35
The school district then filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States on August 28, 2020.36 According to the petitioners, the question presented to the
Court was:

29

Id.
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 444.
31
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2020). This is the opinion published by the Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit.
32
Id. at 176-77.
33
Id. at 189.
34
Id. at 194-97.
35
Id. at 196.
36
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 976 (2021) (No. 20-255), 2020 WL
5234951.
30
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Whether Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), which holds that public school officials may regulate speech that would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, applies
to student speech that occurs off campus.37
On January 8, 2021, the Court granted certiorari.38 In addition to briefs filed by the parties
and the United States Solicitor General, thirty-three organizations39 filed amici curiae briefs,
supporting the school; B.L.; or in one case, neither party.40 The Solicitor General filed a Motion
to Participate in Oral Argument as Amicus Curiae.41 This motion was granted, and attorneys for
the school, B.L., and the Department of Justice participated in an oral argument before the Court
on April 28, 2021.42 On June 23, 2021, the Court handed down a decision affirming the result for
the respondent, B.L., while disagreeing with the reasoning of the majority panel of the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.43 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer handed down a
ten-page decision that included a concurring opinion by Justice Alito which Justice Gorsuch
joined.44 Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter.45
Off-Campus Regulation of Student Speech: The Arguments
By the time the attorneys, Blatt, Stewart, and Cole, faced the Justices on April 28, the issues
and arguments between the parties had been formulated several different ways as the case worked
its way through the federal court system.46 B.L.’s attorneys noted in her Motion for Summary
Judgment at the district court level47 and again in her brief 48 to the United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, that the parties essentially agreed upon the facts of the case but disagreed as to the

37

Id. at I.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
39
Among the groups filing amici curiae briefs were Mary Beth and John Tinker, associations for teachers, school
boards, and college athletics, and groups such as Professor of Law and Education and the First Amendment and
Education Law Society. See Docket Sheet at 1, Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021), (No.
20-255).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Oral Argument at 1, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L, 2021 WL 1692010 (April 28, 2021) (No. 20-255)
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2020/20-255 [https://perma.cc/SZ3Q-LDLS]. Lisa S. Blatt was
the attorney for the petitioner, Mahanoy Area School District. David D. Cole argued for the respondent, B.L. Malcolm
L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner,
Mahanoy Area School District.
43
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 , 2048 (2021).
44
Marcia Coyle, 1st Amendment Protects Cursing Cheerleader's Off-Campus Speech, Justices Say, NAT'L. L. J., June
23, 2021, https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/06/23/1st-amendment-protects-cursing-cheerleaders-offcampus-speech-justices-say/ [https://perma.cc/PTR6-RBUV].
45
Id.
46
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 610-16 (M.D. Pa. 2017); B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist.,
376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 445-37 (M.D. Pa. 2019); B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 178-88, 175 (3d Cir. 2020);
See also the discussion supra pp. 4-8.
47
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff B.L.’s Motion for Summary Judgement, supra note 27, at 1-2.
48
Brief of Appellant to the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.
2020), 2019 WL 2745439.
38
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application of the law to the facts.49 After reading the materials, it was obvious that the parties
disagreed fiercely as to the application of the law to these particular facts.50
At the oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Lisa Blatt, attorney
for the school district, opened with the statement that Tinker should apply to off-campus speech
for three reasons: (1) such speech could cause on-campus disruptions; (2) using the test suggested
by the Respondent, B.L., would create chaos and confusion in the public schools; and (3) because
a school nexus requirement and Tinker’s substantial disruption prong existed, there were sufficient
guardrails to protect students’ off-campus First Amendment rights.51 She concluded her argument
by referring to the Respondent's new test as a “Frankenstein's monster of First Amendment
doctrine all mashed together.”52
Mr. Stewart (“Stewart”), Deputy Solicitor General, then introduced the position of the
United States government, indicating that: “The Third Circuit’s rigid geographic approach is
particularly unsound in the context of online speech since there is no meaningful causal link
between the place from which an online communication is sent and the likelihood that it will
disrupt school operations.”53
Questioned by Justice Breyer, Stewart stated that there should be “no per se rule that offcampus speech is categorically exempt from school regulation.”54 Stewart next noted that the
location from which the online speech was sent was irrelevant as to whether it would cause or not
cause disruption.55 Rather, he argued that the questions to ask were whether this particular speech
would disrupt the operations of a particular school program and what the purposes of the program
were in order to determine whether a substantial disruption occurred.56
Mr. Cole (“Cole”) was the last litigant before the Court.57 His opening remarks pertained
to the First Amendment, stating that it prohibited content discrimination, i.e., the “bedrock
principle is that a speaker cannot be punished because listeners object to his message.”58 He further
explained that “Tinker allows a very narrow exception to the above principle. Speech can be
punished if the listeners object to the speech in a disruptive fashion in a school-supervised or
school-sanctioned setting.”59 Cole further elaborated that expanding Tinker would mean 24/7
regulation of student speech, and it would also interfere with a parent's fundamental right to raise
their child as they saw fit.60
Cole advised Justice Roberts that this was the Respondent's test:
[I]f you are under the school's supervision [or sanction], the school has the
authority[, conferred in accordance with Tinker…to regulate such student speech
in accordance with the above case law principles]. … [I]f you[] [are] outside of the

49

Id. at 10.
Id.
51
Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 4-7.
52
Id. at 37.
53
Id. at 38.
54
Id. at 44.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 3.
58
Id. at 61.
59
Id. at 61-62.
60
Id. at 62.
50
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school’s supervision or sanction,… the same First Amendment rights apply to you
as they apply to everybody else.61
Cole dismissed the school’s and government’s concerns about the needed regulation of some offcampus speech by noting that Tinker did not prevent a school from regulating off-campus speech
that involved threats, bullying, harassment, or cheating.62
Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech
During oral arguments, Justice Breyer, while questioning Stewart, stated “I can't write a
treatise on the First Amendment in this case ….”63 Writing for the majority of the Court,64 Justice
Breyer did not write a First Amendment treatise but was concise65 as he acknowledged the
frivolousness of the case, stating that “[i]t might be tempting to dismiss B.L.‘s words as unworthy
of the robust First Amendment protections discussed herein. But sometimes it is necessary to
protect the superfluous, in order to preserve the necessary.”66
Given that Justice Breyer drafted the majority opinion, his questioning during the oral
argument was illuminating.67 When talking with the Deputy Solicitor General, Justice Breyer
announced that, from his perspective, there were really only one of two ways to handle the case.68
He said:
One, treat it as an example. We can't go beyond that. Look at the record and then
decide. Or the other is everyone seems to want some rule, and the rule, I think,
might be take Tinker as if it said, which it doesn't, as if it said: School, you do have
some authority where there's a substantial injury to -- disruption in the class or
somebody's going to be hurt in that school, et cetera. And I would add: But,
remember, it's outside the school. And that's primarily the domain of the
parents….69
It appears that the majority of Justices adopted the first approach, looking at the record and making
their decision on that basis. The Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, concluding that the school district had violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights, but
it did not agree with the reasoning of the majority panel of the Third Circuit.70
Instead, Justice Breyer’s opinion reaffirmed the existing student speech doctrine as
announced in the quartet of student speech cases of Tinker,71 Bethel,72 Hazelwood,73 and Morse.74
61

Id. at 63, 66-68.
Id. at 66.
63
Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 43.
64
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2038-48 (2021). Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Barrett, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Sotomayor. Id.
65
Id. The majority opinion was ten pages.
66
Id. at 2048.
67
Id. at 2041.
68
Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 43.
69
Id. at 43-44.
70
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (2021).
71
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
72
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
73
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
74
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
62
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The majority acknowledged that three categories of student speech existed that schools could
regulate in certain circumstances, including: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech that is uttered
during a school assembly or on school grounds; (2) speech uttered during a class trip that promotes
illegal drug use; and (3) speech that can be reasonably viewed as bearing the imprimatur of the
school such as that which appears in school newspapers, blogs, or plays.75 Lastly, the majority
said, “schools have a special interest in regulating speech that ‘materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’”76
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which he was joined by Justice Gorsuch.77
While concurring in the result, both Justices approached the reasoning differently, concluding with
the statement, “If today's decision teaches any lesson, it must be that the regulation of many types
of off-campus student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should
proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.”78
Justice Thomas dissented, beginning his comments by saying that the majority overrode
“150 years of history supporting the coach.”79 In his dissent, 80 Justice Thomas argued that the
majority posits "three vague considerations and reaches an outcome."81
Did the Court get it right in this opinion? Did their decision clarify the ability of the public
schools to regulate off-campus student speech? Did it inform students as to what off-campus
student speech is protected and what is not?
To answer these questions, this article will first examine the history of discipline and
speech in schools from the time of Justice Blackstone to the present. It will do a limited review of
the First Amendment doctrine and its content regulation exceptions. It will explore the Supreme
Court of the United States’ doctrine regarding student speech within the public school setting as
well as selected Circuit Court decisions. It will look at the various “tests” suggested by the parties
and apply the one that seems to provide the most clarity to students and school administrators
about student speech rights, both on-campus and off-campus, with the fewest restrictions. It will
then examine who has the power to discipline off-campus student speech and when this power can
be exercised.

75

Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021).
Id.
77
Id. at 2048 (Alito, J., concurring).
78
Id. at 2059 (Alito, J., concurring).
79
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Given his comments in his concurrence in Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-11, Justice Thomas’
dissent in Mahanoy is not surprising. In Morse, Justice Thomas noted that “…the standard set forth in Tinker…is
without basis in the Constitution…. In my view, the history of public education suggests that the First Amendment,
as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”
80
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81
Id.
76
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Background: What Is the Context?
The History of Speech and Discipline in the American Public Schools
How did early schoolmasters handle unruly students? Sir William Blackstone, the bestknown common law English jurist,82 articulated the doctrine of in loco parentis for schoolmasters
in his Commentaries, noting that a parent:
May also delegate part of his parental authority during his life, to the tutor or
schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of
the power of the parent committed to his child, vis., that of restraint and correction
as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.83
Justice Blackstone acknowledged that schoolmasters stood in for parents and could apply
“correction” as needed for unruly students.84 While this approach was primarily applicable to what
was then private education, the doctrine took root in England and America.85
A review of the literature86 regarding education during the American Colonial Period
revealed that education, at that time, was primarily about private education as compulsory
education had not yet been required by the states.87 Noah Webster, a lawyer, a writer, and brother
to Daniel Webster,88 agreed with Justice Blackstone that education was critical for nations.89 Like
Justice Blackstone, Webster too viewed the teacher as being the “parent” in charge at school,
writing:
82

Sir William Blackstone began his career as a lawyer. In 1758, he became the first Vinerian professor at Oxford. In
this position, he began a series of lectures which eventually came to be the basis for his four-volume treatise of English
law known as Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). See William Blackstone, 3 CHI. L. TIMES 109, 114-15
(1889).
83
1William Blackstone & George Chase, American Students’ Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, in
Four Books, BANKS & BROTHERS 160, 168 (1882).
84
Id.
85
John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 260,
261-62 (1987).
86
Newton Edwards & Herman G. Richey, The School in the American Social Order (2d ed., BOSTON, HOUGHTON
MIFFLIN CO., 1963) 3-28, 87-97.
87
Blackstone, infra note 123, at 165, n.5. English courts too adopted Blackstone’s perspective. See Regina v. Hopley,
2 F. & F. 202 (1860) in which Chief Justice Cockburn explained to the jury that “By the law of England, a parent or
a school-master (who for this purpose represents the parent and has parental authority delegated to him) may for the
purpose of correcting what is evil in the child inflict moderate and reasonable corporal punishment, always, however,
with this condition, that it is moderate and reasonable.” Id. at 206. Later cases also grappled with off-campus conduct.
See also Cleary v. Booth, 1 Q.B. 465 (1893) in which Justice Lawrance framed the issue before it as “…whether the
headmaster of a board school is justified in inflicting corporal punishment on a pupil who has misconducted himself
outside the school, on his way to school, and out of school hours?” Concluding that the schoolmaster had the authority,
in these circumstances, to punish the student, Judge Lawrance further stated: “I am of opinion that in such cases the
power of the father, as it was exercised by the appellant is this case, is delegated to the schoolmaster. The regulations
of the Education Department of 1892 contain a clause allowing a grant for discipline and organization…. Should a
boy misbehave himself immediately after leaving the school premises, I am clearly of opinion that in such a case the
schoolmaster would have authority to punish the boy so misconducting himself.” Id. at 468-69.
88
George R. Farnum, Historic New England Shrines of the Law - III. Litchfield, Connecticut, and Its Claims to Fame
- Noah Webster, Hartford Lawyer - New Haven and Windsor - Providence and Newport, 22 A.B.A. J. 238, 240 (1936).
89
Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth In American, in Collection of Essays and Fugitive Writings on Moral,
Historical, Political and Literary Subjects, 22 (1790) (photo) (digitized by Google Books, 2015).
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The rod is often necessary in school; especially after the children have been
accustomed to disobedience and licentious behavior at home …. In schools the
master should be absolute in command; for it is utterly impossible for any man to
support order and discipline among children who are indulged with an appeal to
their parents.90
As the colonies grew and later declared their independence, states began to enact
compulsory education for white males during the Federal Period.91 James Kent, in his
Commentaries on American Law, noted that:
It has been uniformly a part of the land system of the United States to provide for
public schools. By the ordinances of Congress, under the articles of
confederation…it was made a specific condition [for admission to the union] that a
section of each township should be permanently applied for the use of public
schools.92
As compulsory public education of all students became commonplace in the twentieth
century,93 selected decisions regarding public schools and students between 1837 and 1915 reflect
American courts' acceptance of the doctrine of in loco parentis and confusion as to the extent of
the schoolmaster’s authority towards children while off-campus.94 In 1837, in North Carolina,
Judge Gaston acknowledged the doctrine of in loco parentis when he reversed the judgment of the
lower court regarding the indictment and conviction of a schoolmaster for assault and battery.95
He noted the confusion that juries, teachers, students, and societies faced regarding the power of
schoolmasters over students, stating:
It is not easy to state with precision, the power which the law grants to
schoolmasters and teachers, with respect to the correction of their pupils. It is
analogous to that which belong to the parents, and the authority of the teacher is
regarded as a delegation of parental authority.96
In 1859, the Supreme Court of Vermont in Lander v. Seaver97 faced an issue similar to that
faced by the courts in Mahanoy: Can off-campus student speech/conduct be punished?98 The court
phrased the issue before it as: “Has a schoolmaster the right to punish his pupil for acts of
misbehavior committed after the school has been dismissed, and the pupil has returned home and
90
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LAW, 159, 209-225 (1827).
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HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS, Updated 2011 ed.), 79-117; See also R. Freeman Butts & Lawrence A. Cremin, A History
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See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859); Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509
(1886); Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562 (1871); Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 (1885); Wooster v. Sunderland, 27
Cal. App. 51 (1915).
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is engaged in his father’s service.”99 According to the synopsis; the student, Peter Lander, was
driving his father’s cow by the schoolmaster’s house in front of the schoolmaster and fellow pupils
when he referred to the schoolmaster as “Old Jack Seaver.”100 When Lander came to the school
the next morning, Seaver reprimanded him for his “insulting language the evening before”101 and
proceeded to whip him. Lander filed suit, alleging trespass for assault and battery, but Seaver
prevailed.102 Lander then appealed.103 Judge Aldis stated:
When the child has returned home or to his parent's control, then the parental
authority is resumed and the control of the teacher ceases, and then for all ordinary
acts of misbehavior the parent alone has the power to punish….
But where the offense has a direct and immediate tendency to injure the school and
bring the master's authority into contempt, as in this case, when done in the presence
of other scholars and of the master, and with a design to insult him, we think he has
the right to punish the scholar for such acts if he comes again to school.
The misbehavior must not have a merely remote and indirect tendency to injure the
school…. But the tendency of the acts so done out of the teacher's supervision for
which he may punish, must be direct and immediate in their bearing upon the
welfare of the school, or the authority of the master and the respect due to him.104
A later Missouri case, Deskins v. Gose,105 reiterated the principle that schoolmasters
generally lost their authority once the student returned home. Citing Dritt v. Snodgrass,106 the
Supreme Court of Missouri in Deskins noted that “when the pupil of a public school is released
and sent back to his home, … the teacher … had … [no] authority to follow him to his home and
govern his conduct while under the parental eye.”107
In 1955, M.R. Sumption (“Sumption”) attempted to summarize the existing law regarding
the control of “pupil conduct by the school.”108 Sumption said that the control of student conduct
was logically divided into two phases: control of student conduct while on the school premises
during school hours and control of student conduct off the school premises after school.109
Foreshadowing Tinker, Sumption noted that the dividing line between parental and school control
of students off the school’s campus and after hours was not clear.110 However, he noted two
principles which are consistently followed by the court:
The first is that any act of a pupil detrimental to the orderly discipline of well-being
of the school, regardless of where committed, is of legitimate concern to the school.
The second is that the school has prohibitory and punitive power over the acts of
99
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pupils which interfere with their school work or with other pupils, or reflect on the
reputation of the school.111
As schools, teachers, students, and courts struggled with the decision as to who had the
power to control student behavior at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of
the United States also began to grapple with the allocation of power between parents and the
state.112 In a series of cases,113 beginning in 1923, the Court began to define the allocation of power
of parents and the state over children. The first case to be decided, Meyer v. Nebraska,114 concluded
that individuals had the “right to … marry, establish a home and bring up children”115 and struck
down the offending statute as failing the “reasonable relation” test required by the Court.116
Two years later, another school case came along: Pierce v. Society of Sisters.117 In Pierce,
the state of Oregon enacted legislation that required parents to send their minor children to the
local public school rather than a private school.118 Parents appealed, and the Court again decided
in their favor, limiting the power of the State.119 In Pierce, the Court stated:
The Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often
heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged
by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.120
Yet, this expansion of parental rights was halted in 1944 with the Court's decision in Prince
v. Massachusetts,121 which upheld a Massachusetts labor statute, forbidding girls under the age of
eighteenth from engaging in selling materials on the street against a parent’s claim that such
legislation interfered with their religious beliefs.122 Upholding the legislation against the plaintiff’s
First Amendment Freedom of Religion claims, the Court said:
111
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[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest….neither rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general
interest in youth’s well being, the state as parents patriae may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s
labor, and in many other ways. 123
In 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court returned to its expansion, allowing Amish parents
an exemption from the state’s compulsory education laws as applied to high school.124 The Court
reasoned:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education …. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of
the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made
to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately
operated system. There the Court held that Oregon’s statute compelling attendance
in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest
of parents in directing the rearing of their off-spring, including their education in
church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental direction of
the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society …. Thus a State’s interest in universal
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long
as they, in the words of Pierce, “prepare (them) for additional obligations.”125
These four cases demonstrate the inherent tension in the allocation of power between the state and
parents over control of children. Adding schools, teachers, and speech into this mixture makes it
more complicated.
With this lack of clarity, the Supreme Court of the United States was finally called upon in
1968, in Tinker v. Des Moines, to decide what, if any, First Amendment rights students in the
public school system had.126 After Tinker, a line of student speech cases followed127 with the
Supreme Court of the United States delineating the rules regarding student speech. Mahanoy Area
School District v. B.L. is the latest decision on the topic since the Court first visited it in 1968.128
The First Amendment: The Free Speech Doctrine and the “Special Characteristics” of the Public
School
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The First Amendment and the Free Speech Doctrine
On June 8, 1789, James Madison introduced the free speech language, that would later
become the First Amendment, in the House of Representatives.129 Madison's document stated,
“The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write or to publish their
sentiments; and freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty shall be inviolate.”130
When referred to the Senate, a committee altered the language to say, “Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of people to peaceably assemble
and consult for their common good, and to petition the government for a redress of their
grievances.”131 It passed and became the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.132 While there is
no debate that illuminates the Founders’ intentions,133 it is thought that it reflected Justice
Blackstone‘s common law view, which said:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the
restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the
Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man and
make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning,
religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be
adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and
good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.
Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the
object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of
thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or
making public, of bad sentiments, destructive to the ends of society, is the crime
which society corrects.134
As passed, the Bill of Rights prohibited action that interfered with an individual’s freedom of
speech by the federal government.135 Eventually, the Bill of Rights was deemed to be
“incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment136 and became applicable to state government
action.137
129
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What did it mean that the government could make no law “abridging the freedom of
speech?”138 Did that mean that an individual was allowed to say anything without any
consequences? Were there any exceptions? If so, what were these exceptions?
The First Amendment Doctrine of Free Speech and Its Exceptions: Content Regulation
While the Court initially viewed Justice Blackstone’s prohibition against prior restraints as
the primary principle of the First Amendment,139 this view began to change in the early twentieth
century as the Supreme Court's Justices began to examine and determine the role of the First
Amendment in American life.140 In Konisgsberg v. State Bar of California,141 Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, rejected the absolutist position regarding the First Amendment.142 Justice
Harlan said:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association … as
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are “absolutes”, not only in the
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but
also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a
literal reading of the First Amendment.143
The free speech doctrine as it has evolved in the Court throughout the twentieth century is
complex and numerous tests have developed under which First Amendment issues can be
analyzed.144 There are a few categories of content-based regulation that are recognized by the
Court including defamation, clear and present danger, inciting violence, and obscenity.145 During
the oral arguments in Mahonoy, specifically during an exchange between Justice Sotomayor and
B.L.’s attorney, Mr. Cole, Justice Sotomayor noted that:
[W]e have traditional categories: fighting words, obscenity, true threats. We even
have definitions of what constitutes sexual harassment. The level at which speech
has to arrive to meet those standards is very, very high, and I’m dubious that most
of the conduct that teenagers engage in would fit any of our traditional categories.146
Because of the “special characteristics”147 of public schools, the Court eventually faced the issue
of student speech, student conduct, and First Amendment protections in the public school
setting.148
Student Speech and the First Amendment
138
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The Supreme Court of the United States
Until 1968, the Court had not directly addressed the issue of speech, the First Amendment,
and students’ rights in the public school setting.149 At that time, the Court heard oral arguments in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,150 and the Court issued an opinion
in 1969. Tinker, at fifty-two, is the landmark student speech case.151 It was followed by Bethel,
Hazelwood, and Morse, all of which limited Tinker’s holdings.152
In Tinker, John and Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt attended high school in
Des Moines, Iowa.153 They, along with their parents, were opposed to the Vietnam War and
decided to publicize their feelings by wearing black arm bands to school.154 The high school
principal learned of their plan and adopted a policy which prohibited the wearing of arm bands to
school.155 If a student wore an armband to school, she would be asked to remove it.156 If the student
refused to remove the armband, the student would be suspended until agreeing to return to school
without it.157
On December 16, 1965, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their black
armbands to school.158 John Tinker joined them on December 17.159 All three students were
suspended and sent home.160 They did not return to school until the new year, after the December
holidays had ended.161 Their parents then filed suit in the United States District Court Southern
District. Iowa, Central Division162, alleging a violation of their children's First Amendment rights
and a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 The district court dismissed the complaint, and
the students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.164 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision by an equally divided court.165 The Supreme Court of the
United States then granted certiorari.166
As developed by the school district’s attorney, the question before the Court was stated as:
149
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[W]hether the action of officials of defendant school district forbidding the wearing
of arm bands on school facilities as a means of protesting the Viet Nam War
deprived petitioners of Constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.167
Justice Fortas drafted the majority’s opinion, explaining the conflict facing the Court.168 He began
by acknowledging that teachers and students have First Amendment rights even in light of the
“special characteristics of the school environment.”169 He uttered the now famous phrase, “It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”170 Yet he also noted that “the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools.”171
The majority reversed and remanded the decision, holding that:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupt classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.172
This became the Tinker test, a two-prong test, applied to student speech cases.173 Additional
guidance could be gleaned from the Court with several statements, including:
[T]he State…must be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.174
[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do
not possess absolute authority over their students.175
We properly read [the First Amendment] to permit reasonable regulation of speechconnected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.176
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While Justices Stewart and White concurred with Justice Fortas’ majority opinion,177 Justices
Black and Harlan dissented.178 Justice Black was scathing in his denunciation of the majority’s
opinion.179 He stated:
In my view, teachers in state-controlled public schools are hired to teach there ….
[A] teacher is not paid to go into school and teach subjects the State does not hire
him to teach as part of its selected curriculum. Nor are public school students sent
to the schools at public expense to broadcast political or any other views to educate
and inform the public. The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet
abandoned as worthless or not of date, was that children had not yet reached the
point of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders….
I hope, [to] be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send children to school
on the premise that at their age the need to learn, not teach.180
Tinker stood alone as the only Supreme Court student speech case until the Court again
faced the issue of a suspended student who was removed as a graduation speaker in Bethel School
District v. Fraser.181 In Bethel, student, Matthew Fraser (“Fraser”), gave a speech supporting a
classmate for elective office before the entire student body which consisted of 600 students.182 The
speech was full of “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”183 which titillated some of
the older students while bewildering some of the younger ones.184 Fraser had earlier shared his
speech with some of his teachers who told him that the speech was not appropriate and that it
should not be delivered.185 In spite of this warning, Fraser delivered his speech.186
The day after he delivered his speech, Fraser was summoned to the principal’s office where
he was told that his conduct had violated the school’s disciplinary policy which provided that
“[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the education process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language and gestures.”187 Fraser was suspended for three
days, and his name was removed from the list of eligible students to be graduation speakers.188
Fraser appealed his punishment through the school district’s grievance process but was not
successful.189
Fraser, through his father, then sued the school in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, alleging that Bethel School District had violated his First
Amendment rights as well as given rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.190 The district court
concluded that the school had violated Fraser’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, awarding
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him nominal damages, litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees.191 An appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit followed.192 This court affirmed the district court’s judgment, “holding
that respondent’s speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband in Tinker ….”193 An
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States then followed where the Court was faced with
deciding whether a student’s discipline for using lewd speech at high school assembly is prohibited
by the First Amendment.194
Chief Justice Burger drafted the majority opinion for the Court.195 He began his analysis
by noting that adults may have protected First Amendment rights that do not permit punishment
for the use of an offensive phrase, but those same rights do not necessarily extend to children in a
public school setting.196 Citing New Jersey v. TLO,197 Justice Burger reminded his audience that
the “constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically co-extensive with the
rights of adults in other settings.”198 Justice Burger’s opinion reversed the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, holding that “[T]he First Amendment does not prevent school officials
from determining that to permit vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine
the school’s basic educational mission.”199 While Justice Blackman concurred in the result, Justice
Brennan wrote a separate concurring opinion.200 Justices Marshall and Stevens wrote separate
dissenting opinions.201
A year later, the Court confronted another First Amendment student speech case in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.202 Here, students on the high school newspaper filed suit,
alleging that their First Amendment rights were violated when the high school principal censored
certain articles from an edition of the newspaper.203 The school newspaper, The Spectrum, was
written and edited by the school’s Journalism II class at the high school.204 The journalism teacher
typically submitted page proofs to the principal for review before the issue was published.205
Because the usual journalism teacher was not available and a quick turnaround time was needed,
the principal reviewed the proofs and was concerned about two articles: one concerned with
student pregnancies while the other was concerned with parental divorce.206 The principal said that
he was concerned that all parties in both articles were identifiable and might expose the school to
liability if published.207 Thus, he withheld the articles from publication.208 The students involved
in the publication of the disputed issue then filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, seeking an injunction and monetary damages for the school’s
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violation of their First Amendment rights.209 The district court held that the school could impose
restraints on the students’ speech that was an integral part of the school’s educational function.210
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, then reversed, holding that the record held no
evidence that the articles would have materially disrupted class or given rise to substantial disorder
as Tinker required.211
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari.212 The Court saw the issue
before it as to what extent may educators “exercise editorial control over the contents of a high
school newspaper produced as part of the school’s journalism curriculum.”213 Writing for the
majority, Justice White reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that:
[T]he standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish
student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may
refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression ….
Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concernts.214
Again, there was no unanimous opinion as Justice Brennan drafted a dissent that was joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun.215
The Court was silent on this issue for twenty years until it agreed to hear Morse v. Frederick
in 2007.216 In Morse, Joseph Frederick was a high school student at Juneau-Douglas High School
in Juneau, Alaska.217 In 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay was scheduled to pass through Juneau on
its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah.218 The relay would pass in front of the high
school while school was in session, so students were allowed to leave the school and stand across
the street to observe the relay.219 This was considered to be a “class trip” at which “school rules”
applied.220
As the students stood outside observing the relay and camera crews passed, Joseph
Frederick unfurled a fourteen-foot banner with the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”221 Because the
banner was so large, it was easily readable by others.222 The high school principal, Deborah Morse,
noticed the banner and immediately headed over to Joseph.223 She demanded that all students take
down their banners immediately.224 Everyone complied except Frederick, so Morse confiscated
209
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his banner and ordered him to report to her office.225 In the office, Morse suspended Frederick for
ten days because she believed his banner promoted illegal drug use which was a violation of a
school board policy.226
Frederick appealed his suspension through the school board procedure but lost.227 He then
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, alleging that his First
Amendment rights were violated and argued the school’s actions gave rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action.228 While the district court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment, the United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed.229 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari230 to determine whether Morse had a First Amendment right to wield his
banner.231
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion for the Court, noting that this was a
school speech case even if it technically occurred off-campus.232 Justice Roberts stated that “social
events and class trips are subject to district rules for student conduct …. Frederick cannot ‘stand
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim
he is not at school.’”233 The issue faced by the Court in this case was “whether a principal may,
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech
is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”234 The Court answered this question with a
“yes”235 and reversed the opinion of the Ninth Circuit.236
Justice Roberts reviewed the holdings of Tinker, Bethel, and Hazelwood, trying to clarify
the student speech doctrine in the public school setting.237 He stated that Tinker said that student
speech could not be suppressed “unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will ‘materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school….’”238 Bethel was the “next student
speech case” in which the Court “marked [a] distinction between the political message of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of Fraser's speech.”239 Bethel’s holding said that “school
boards have the authority to determine ‘what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate.’”240 Hazelwood held that “expressive activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school241￼
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could be regulated by a school as long as the “ … are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”242 With Morse, Justice Roberts concluded that the “special characteristics of the school
environment” “to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
use.”243 As with all of the student speech cases thus far, there was no unanimity. 244 Justice Thomas
concurred245 as did Justice Breyer who also dissented in part.246 Justice Stephens dissented, and
his dissent was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.247
After this quartet of cases, it seemed that the analysis to be used to determine whether a
school’s discipline of student speech violated the First Amendment was:
1. Did the speech create a substantial or material disruption of the school or invade
the rights of others?
If not, did the speech fit within one of the three categories below?
a.
b.
c.

Did the speech involve lewd and vulgar speech at the school?
Did the speech carry the imprimatur of the school?
Lastly, did the speech promote illegal drug use at school or at a
school-sanctioned event?248

If a school could answer “yes” to any of the above questions, it seemed likely that under the
existing school law, as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, that school’s
discipline of the student would be permitted.
For twenty-two years, from 2007 until 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States heard
no student speech cases.249 During this time, home computers and eventually student cell phones
became ubiquitous and made it possible for students to use social media to “speak instantaneously
to an audience of the whole school, forcing school administrators”250 to decide whether to respond
to or discipline off-campus student speech. Bullying, harassment, and other forms of misbehavior
became commonplace on the Internet and via social media.251 Children and their parents came to
school crying.252
As Daniel Solove noted in his 2007 book, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and
Privacy on the Internet,253 “People need to remember that words can hurt, quoting a professor on
a college campus.254 Solove responds to this comment, saying: “Words can certainly sting, but
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what about free speech? What about privacy?” 255 As communication became instantaneous with
these new technologies, schools muddled through with the Tinker quartet analysis, trying to
balance students’ free speech rights with their rights to be free from bullying and harassment.
Administrative decisions regarding students and speech were disputed, and lawsuits were filed.256
Courts from different circuits and states often reached different results from one another.257
Mahanoy Area School District, in both their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari258 and Brief
to the Court,259 argued that a circuit split existed regarding whether school officials could discipline
students for off-campus speech.260 B.L., through her attorneys, denied such a split existed in both
her Brief in Opposition to Certiorari261 and her Brief262 to the Court. Instead, B.L. focused on
distinguishing the cases.263
Circuit and State Court Cases
Mahanoy Area School District argued that a split existed within the circuit courts as to
whether Tinker permitted school officials to discipline students for off-campus speech and
conduct.264 According to Mahanoy’s brief, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had allowed school officials to punish students for offcampus speech while the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, had come to the opposite
conclusion.265 The school’s brief began by discussing Wisniewski v. Board of Education266 and
Doninger v. Niehoff,267 both cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, first dealt with the suspension of a
middle school student for off-campus speech in Wisniewski.268 Aaron Wisniewski was suspended
because of a message that he sent to his classmates from his parents’ home computer.269 He sent
an icon that was “… a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which
were dots representing spattered blood …. Beneath the drawing appeared the words ‘Kill Mr.
255
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VanderMolen.’ Philip VanderMolen was Aaron’s English teacher at the time.”270 Classmates
receiving the message shared it with Mr. VanderMolen who was distressed.271 VanderMolen then
shared it with school authorities.272 From there, it was shared with the local superintendent’s office
which later shared it with the police department.273 Aaron was confronted and acknowledged that
he had created the icon but insisted it was intended only as a joke.274
The police department then investigated and questioned Aaron, 275 and he was referred to
a psychologist for testing.276 After a brief stay in a local mental hospital, Aaron was sent to a
hearing before the school superintendent.277 The superintendent found that “Substantial and
competent evidence exists that Aaron engaged in the act of sending a threatening message to his
buddies, the subject of which was a teacher. The superintendent admitted it …. I conclude Aaron
did commit the act of threatening a teacher … creating an environment threatening the health,
safety and welfare of others ….”278 Aaron was suspended for a semester.279
Aaron sued, arguing his icon was speech that was protected under the First Amendment.280
The court upheld the school’s punishment of Aaron, concluding that the fact that his conduct
occurred off-campus did not “necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”281 Instead, the court
applied Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable risk” test to the facts and concluded that it was
foreseeable that school authorities would learn of Aaron’s pistol icon.282 It was also foreseeable
that the threatening icon would “materially and substantially” disrupt the school’s work.283 The
requirements of Tinker were satisfied, and the court upheld the school’s decision.284
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reaffirmed its
commitment to Wisniewski with its decision in Doninger v. Niehoff.285 Avery Doninger
(“Doninger”), a student, was involved in a dispute with school officials about the scheduling of a
group of bands known as JamFest.286 Doninger and the Student Council were advised that JamFest
would either have to be rescheduled or relocated unless students agreed to flexibility regarding
JamFest.287 The Student Council was infuriated by these choices, met in the school’s computer
lab, accessed a parent’s email account,288 and sent a mass email to students, teachers, and parents,
advising them to contact Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent, regarding JamFest.289 Avery
continued to be angry about the topic, so she posted an entry on her blog from her home that said:

270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wisniewski, 494 F. 3d at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
Wisniewski, 494 F. 3d at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
Id.
Id.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F. 3d 344, 353 (2nd Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011).
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol27/iss1/1

24

Smith-Butler: “PROTECTING THE SUPERFLUOUS…TO PRESERVE THE NECESSARY”: WHOSE IS

Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that we
sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book
to help get support for jamfest. Basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is
getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and
we really appreciate it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the
whole thing altogether ….290
Because of the blog posting, the school decided that Avery could not run for Senior Class
Secretary because her conduct “failed to display the civility and good citizenship expected of class
officers.”291 Doninger sued, arguing that the school's actions violated her First Amendment
rights.292
As the Second Circuit analyzed Doninger’s First Amendment claims, the court cited
Tinker, noting that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate ….”293 Utilizing the “foreseeable disruption test” articulated by
Tinker, the court stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of the school’s authority to
regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur on school grounds or at a
school sponsored event. We have determined, however, that a student may be
disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds,
when this conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment,” at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the offcampus expression might also reach campus.294
The following year, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, addressed a similar
issue, i.e., whether schools could punish students for speech and conduct that took place offcampus, outside of school when it decided two cases, Snyder v. Blue Mountain and Layshock v.
Hermitage.295 Snyder came from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania296 while Hermitage arose in
the Western District of Pennsylvania.297 Both cases involved similar facts; yet two different panels
from the Third Circuit appeared to reach opposite results.298
In Layshock, the initial Third Circuit panel framed the issue before it as whether “a school
district can punish a student for expressive conduct that originated outside of the classroom, when
that conduct did not disturb the school environment and was not related to any school sponsored
event.”299 Justin Layshock (“Layshock”), a high school senior, posted a parody profile of his high
school principal, Eric Trosch, at his grandmother’s home, using her computer.300 Layshock used
290
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no school resources other than copying a picture of the principal from the school’s website and
pasting it to his parody.301 Justin’s parody about Mr. Trosch stated:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
Number of Drugs I have taken: big302
Layshock shared the profile with his friends at school,303 and Mr. Trosch’s eleventh grade
daughter saw the profile, and she then shared it with her father.304 Mr. Trosch was appalled by the
profile, finding it “degrading, demeaning, demoralizing, and shocking.”305 Because Justin's
behavior was believed to violate the School District’s Discipline Code, he was suspended for ten
days.306
With his parents, Justin sued, arguing that the Hermitage School District had violated his
First Amendment rights.307 The Third Circuit panel published their opinion on February 4, 2010,
and affirmed the decision of the district court.308 The panel held that “schools may punish
expressive conduct that occurs outside of school as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate’
under certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”309 Layshock prevailed
over the school.310
On the same day, another Third Circuit panel published its opinion in Snyder v. Blue
Mountain School District.311 A middle school student, J.S., also created a profile parody of her
high school principal, Mr. McGonigle (“McGonigle”), from her home computer.312 J.S. too copied
a picture of her principal from the school’s website, pasted it online on her MySpace profile, but
used no other school resources.313 The profile did not identify McGonigle by name or location, but
it included his school photograph.314 It described him as saying:
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HELLO CHILDREN yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, sex
addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL I have come to
myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal's to be just like me. I know, I
know, you're all thrilled…Another reason I came to my space is because–I am
keeping an eye on you students (who i care for so much) For those who want to be
my friend, and aren't in my school I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks
on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks
like a man (who satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN so please, feel free to add
me, message me whatever315
Students at Blue Mountain Middle School became aware of and discussed the profile.316
Eventually it was shared with McGoingle317 who viewed the profile and contacted the school
superintendent.318 School officials met and decided the profile “violated the School District’s
Acceptable Use Policy (“AUP”).” 319 J.S. was then suspended.320
J.S., via her parents, sued, arguing the Blue Mountain School District had violated her First
Amendment rights.321 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
held that the school did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights when disciplining her because
of the on-campus impact of her “lewd and vulgar” speech.322 The Third Circuit’s panel323 affirmed
the lower court’s decision.324 According to the panel, Tinker’s “foreseeable” and “material and
substantial disruption” test was the appropriate analysis to be applied to the facts.325 In this
situation, J.S.’s conduct had created a substantial disruption, thus satisfying Tinker.326
How did the Third Circuit resolve these two opinions that appeared to be directly in conflict
with one another? The court sat, en banc, to rehear both cases.327 Layshock was affirmed, and the
en banc court held that the school had violated Justin Layshock’s First Amendment rights.328 The
en banc court found that school officials had very limited authority, per Tinker and Bethel, to
punish off-campus student speech.329 Without a substantial disruption, Tinker was not
applicable.330 While Bethel allowed school authorities to discipline student speech that was “lewd”
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or “vulgar,” this authority was limited to on-campus lewd or vulgar speech.331 The court stated,
“Fraser does not allow the School District to punish Justin for expressive conduct that occurred
outside of the school context.”332
In Snyder v. Blue Mountain, the en banc court remanded the decision to the district court,
reversing in part and affirming in part.333 While the court concluded that the school’s disciplinary
policies were not facially unconstitutional,334 it reversed the holding that the school could punish
J.S.’s speech.335 Noting that schools could suppress or punish student speech in certain situations,
the court stated “[t]he authority of public school officials is not boundless ….”336 The court’s
analysis indicated that while the court acknowledged that a school could suppress or punish student
speech in the public school setting, school officials must demonstrate the following in order to
prevail in court:
1. Show that the forbidden speech or conduct; and
2. Would materially and substantially interfere with the appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school.337
The court concluded that if Tinker was not applicable, then the Bethel, Hazelwood, or Morse
exceptions applied.338 Bethel allowed schools to discipline school speech, categorized as lewd or
vulgar, when a captive audience was involved.339 Hazelwood allowed discipline for pedagogical
reasons of school sponsored speech.340 Morse then established that speech, even if off-campus but
at a school sponsored event, which advocated illegal drug use could also be punished.341 Applying
this analysis to the facts of the case, the court concluded that none of the exceptions articulated by
Bethel, Hazelwood or Morse were applicable.342 Tinker was the only standard by which the school
could punish J.S.’s speech,343 but the school was unable to meet Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
test.344 In this manner, the en banc panel resolved and reconciled its earlier holdings in Layshock
and Snyder.345
At approximately the same time, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, was
handling a similar issue in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.346 Kara Kowalski, a student at
Musselman High, created a MySpace page at home with her home computer, and named the page
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“S.A.S.H.” which she said stood for “No Herpes. We don’t want no herpes.”347 She invited her
friends to join, and some of her friends were also students at Musselman High.348 Another
classmate, Ray Parsons, joined the group and then uploaded a picture of himself, holding his nose
with a sign that said, “Shay Has Herpes.”349 This referred to another classmate, Shay N. Parsons,
who uploaded two additional photos. 350 One of which Parson “had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s
face to simulate herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read, ‘Warning: Enter at your
own risk.’ In the second photograph, he captioned Shay N.’s face with a sign that read, ‘portrait of
a whore.’”351
Shay N. learned of the page and was in tears.352 Along with her parents, she went to the
high school the next day to meet with school officials.353 After the meeting, Shay filed a complaint
of harassment with the school.354 The central school board, after being contacted,355 investigated
and decided that Kowalski had created a “hate website” that was in violation of the Berkeley Board
of Education’s Harassment, Bullying and Intimidation Policy and its Student Code of Conduct.356
The school suspended Kowalski for ten days.357
Kowalski sued, alleging a violation of her First Amendment free speech rights.358 Her suit
was based on the fact that the school disciplined her for “off-campus, non-school related speech”359
for which it had neither the right nor the authority to punish her.360 After losing at the district court,
Kowalski appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.361
The Fourth Circuit defined the issue facing it as “whether Kowalski’s activity fell within
the outer boundaries of the high school’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and
protecting the well-being and educational rights of students.”362 Concluding it did, the court
affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia’s decision,
upholding the school’s punishment of Kowalski.363 The fact that the student speech involved
occurred off-campus did not determine the power of the school administrators to impose
discipline.364 Rather, Tinker allowed the school to discipline Kowalski because Tinker allowed
schools to intervene where student speech invaded the rights of others to be “let alone.”365 Since
Kowalski’s speech targeted a classmate, the court proclaimed that it was “reasonably foreseeable”
that the speech would impact students while at school and create substantial disruption.366
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Because of the inconsistent decisions in Layshock, Snyder, and Kowalski, the perspective
was that a circuit split existed as to whether schools could discipline students for off-campus
student speech.367 All three cases petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari,
but the Court denied certiorari for all three.368 As later cases indicate, the disagreement over the
understanding and application of Tinker’s text to off-campus speech continued.
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, faced another issue regarding the
discipline of a student for off-campus speech in Bell v. Itawamaba City School Board.369 Taylor
Bell (“Bell”) posted a video on the internet of a rap recording that he had created off-campus.370
He made threats in this video against two teachers and coaches.371 The school board believed this
recording to contain “language [perceived] as threatening, harassing, and intimidating [to] the
teachers ….”372 The language complained of was “betta watch your back / … I'm going to hit you
with my rueger; you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / ….”373
Bell was then disciplined and in response Bell sued alleging that the school had violated his First
Amendment rights.374 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
granted the school’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Bell appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.375 A panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the school had violated Bell’s
First Amendment rights.376 En banc review was requested and granted.377 The en banc panel said
the issue it confronted was:
[W]hether, consistent with the requirements of the First Amendment, off-campus
speech directed intentionally at the school community and reasonably understood
by school officials to be threatening, harassing, and intimidating to a teacher
satisfies the almost 50-year-old standard for restricting student speech, based on a
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption.378
The panel, applying Tinker to the facts, concluded that the school board could have perceived the
threats as creating a substantial disruption.379 The en banc panel then affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for the school.380
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, also decided two cases381 on the topic.
In D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District, Dylan Mardis (“Mardis”), was chatting online with
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another classmate, C. M,382 when Mardis told C.M. that he intended to get a gun and kill certain
classmates. 383 In particular naming students that he would “get rid of.”384 C.M. forwarded
Mardis’s chats to school authorities which resulted in Mardis’s arrest and detention in the local
psychiatric ward.385 When Mardis was released from the hospital, he tried to return to school only
to be suspended for ten days for making threats.386 Mardis was later suspended for the rest of the
school year after a school board hearing.387
Mardis argued that the suspension violated his First Amendment free speech rights while
the school countered that his speech constituted a threat which violated the school’s conduct
policy388 and was not protected by the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri’s decision for the school was upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit which held that “[t]rue threats are not protected under the First
Amendment … here … [the school] was given enough information that it reasonably feared D.J.M.
had access to a handgun and was thinking about shooting specific classmates at the high school.”389
In S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District,390 twin brothers, Steven and
Sean Wilson, created a website called North Press which also contained a blog.391 The purpose of
the blog was to discuss “issues” at the school and to satirize and vent about these issues.392 Between
December 13 and 16, 2011, the students posted offensive racist and sexist comments, mentioning
specific female students by name.393
There was a dispute as to whether the Wilsons used the school's computers to upload files
to the website.394 What was undisputed was that the school found out about the blog on December
16, and the reaction was swift.395 The Wilson twins were immediately suspended for ten days on
December 16.396 At a second hearing, the twins were suspended for 180 days but were allowed to
go to another school for the duration of their suspension.397 The Wilsons sued in federal district
court, alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights.398 The district court granted the
Wilsons a preliminary injunction which the school then appealed.399
As the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit reviewed decisions from other
circuits, it vacated the district court’s order for a preliminary injunction and reversed.400 Citing the
recent Eighth Circuit decision in D.J.M.,401 the court said: “. . . Tinker applies to off-campus
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student speech where it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community
and cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting.402
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, also faced a similar issue of off-campus
speech and student safety.403 In Wynar v. Douglas County School District,404 Judge McKeown
opened the opinion by noting the tightrope that school administrators walk. He said:
[S]chool administrators face the daunting task of evaluating potential threats of
violence and keeping their students safe without impinging on their constitutional
rights. It is a feat like tightrope balancing, where an error in judgment can lead to a
tragic result. Courts have long dealt with the tension between students’ First
Amendment rights and “the special characteristics of the school environment….”
But the challenge for administrators is made all the more difficult because, outside
of the official school environment, students are instant messaging, texting,
emailing, Twittering, Tumblring, and otherwise communicating electronically,
sometimes about subjects that threaten the safety of the school environment. At the
same time, school officials must take care not to overreact and to take into account
the creative juices and often startling writings of the students.405
Landon Wynar (“Wynar”) was a student at Douglas High School.406 He drafted violent and
threatening instant messages from his home, sharing them with his high school classmates.407 He
bragged about the weapons that he possessed, he threatened to shoot specific classmates, and he
then threatened to shoot classmates on a specific date.408 During his sophomore year, Wynar said:
1.

[in response to a statement that he would “kill everyone”] “no, just the blacks / and
mexicans / halfbreeds / athiests / french / gays / liberals / david”
2. [referring to a classmate] “no im shooting her boobs off / then paul (hell take a 50rd
clip) / then i reload and take out everybody else on the list / hmm paul should be last
that way i can get more people before they run away...”
3. “i wish then i could kill more people / but i have to make due with what i got. / 1 sks
& 150 rds / 1 semi-auto shot gun w/sawed off barrle / 1 pistle”409
Upon receiving these messages, Wynar’s classmates became concerned about his state of mind
and the safety of the students at school.410 They spoke to a coach who took them to the school’s
principal.411 After seeing these messages, the school administration contacted the police.412 The
police came to the school and interviewed Wynar on-campus before taking him into custody.413
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Wynar admitted to making the threats but denied that the threats were serious.414 He insisted that
the messages were a joke.415 School officials then suspended Wynar for ten days.416 The school
board then held a formal hearing for Wynar, alleging that he violated Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.4655.417
This code provision permitted the ninety-day suspension of a student held to be a habitual
discipline problem.418 The board concluded that this was applicable to Wynar and suspended him
for ninety days.419
Wynar, through his father, then sued the school district, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.420 The United States District Court
of Nevada denied Wynar’s Motion for Summary Judgment but granted the school district’s same
motion.421 Wynar then appealed.422
As the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, addressed the issue, it first noted that
the material facts were not in dispute.423 Thus, the court had to decide whether any of the Supreme
Court of the United States’ student speech decisions were applicable.424 Concluding that Bethel,
Hazelwood, and Morse were inapplicable, the court then focused on Tinker, having to decide
whether it was applicable to these facts.425 Focusing on the “substantial disruption” and the
“invasion of the rights of others” prongs of Tinker, the court concluded that Tinker’s tests had been
satisfied in this situation even if the speech was made 426.￼ The court said:
The nature of the threats here was alarming and explosive. Confronted with a
challenge to the safety of its students, Douglas County did not need to wait for an
actual disruption to materialize before taking action. “Tinker does not
require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act
.... ‘In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances….’” We
look to “all of the circumstances confronting the school officials that might
reasonably portend disruption.427”
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.428
The last case to be reviewed in this section is a state case rather than a federal case.429 It
was chosen because it was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, i.e., the highest court
of the state in which the Mahanoy case occurred.430 Justice Cappy opened the opinion by stating
the issue as:
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[W]hether a school district may, consistent with the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, discipline a student for creating at home, and posting on the
Internet, a web site that, inter alia, contained derogatory, profane, offensive and
threatening statements directed toward one of the student's teachers and his
principal.431
J.S. was a middle school student at Nitschmann Middle School, which was part of the
Bethlehem Area School District.432 J.S., using his home computer, created a web site that he named
Teacher Sux.433 Before entering the site, users had to click on a disclaimer which said that the user
agreed not to notify the school about the site.434 The site accused teachers of engaging in sex with
one another, but the most troublesome area concerned a teacher, Mrs. Fulmer.435 The web site said:
“Why Fulmer Should be Fired.” This page set forth, again in degrading terms, that
because of her physique and her disposition, Mrs. Fulmer should be terminated
from her employment.… [A]nother web page morphed a picture of Mrs. Fulmer's
face into that of Adolph Hitler and stated “The new Fulmer Hitler movie. The
similarities astound me.” Finally, along with the criticism of Mrs. Fulmer, a web
page provided answers for certain math lessons.
The most striking web page regarding Mrs. Fulmer, however, was captioned, “Why
Should She Die?” Immediately below this heading, the page requested the reader
to “Take a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help pay
for the hitman.” The diagram consisted of a photograph of Mrs. Fulmer with various
physical attributes highlighted to attract the viewers’ attention. Below the statement
questioning why Mrs. Fulmer should die, the page offered “Some Words from the
writer” and listed 136 times “F ___ You Mrs. Fulmer. You Are A B ____. You Are
A Stupid B ____.” Another page set forth a diminutive drawing of Mrs. Fulmer
with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.436
The website was viewed by students who shared it with teachers.437 Ultimately, the teachers alerted
the principal who convened a faculty meeting about it and then notified both the local police and
the FBI; both organizations declined to charge J.S.438
Mrs. Fulmer, the victim of the website, learned of the threats, became frightened, and was
unable to finish the school year.439 She requested and received approved medical leave which
required that three substitute teachers be hired to finish out the year.440 J.S. finished the school
year, continuing to attend classes and participate in extracurricular activities.441 At the end of the
school year, the school district sent J.S. a letter, advising him that he would be suspended for three
431
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days because of the website.442 It later increased the suspension to ten days and then decided to
begin expulsion proceedings against J.S.443 J.S. did not attend the hearings but was notified that
the school had expelled him.444 J.S., through his father, then filed suit, alleging that the school
district’s behavior had violated his First Amendment rights.445 J.S. lost in the lower courts so
appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which affirmed the decisions of the three-member
Commonwealth Court.446
The Court opened its analysis by noting that the “right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances,” citing to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.447 After reviewing
Tinker, Bethel, and Hazelwood as well as existing First Amendment doctrine and its exceptions,448
the Court concluded that J.S.’s website was not a true threat and that neither Bethel nor Hazelwood
were applicable.449 It upheld the lower court’s decision, concluding that Tinker’s substantial
disruption prong was satisfied with the disruption created when Mrs. Fulmer took a medical leave
and was replaced by substitute teachers.450
While the above list is selective rather than comprehensive, the above cases are the primary
cases relied upon by both parties.451 The school district cited the cases for the proposition that a
circuit split existed452 while B.L. argued that no such split existed.453 Instead, her argument was
that all of these cases could be distinguished.454 The arguments made by the parties will be
discussed next.
The Arguments: What Was Said?
B.L.’s Approach
B.L. initiated the lawsuit, arguing that the school’s discipline violated her First Amendment
rights.455 Requesting a TRO and then a preliminary injunction, her attorneys initially argued that
the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit’s precedent in Layshock and Snyder made it clear
that schools had no authority to punish off-campus school speech because the speech was
disrespectful or profane.456 The attorneys further argued that the courts had yet to decide whether
off-campus speech could be punished under Tinker.457 Yet even if Tinker was applicable, there
442
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was nothing in the record to indicate that the coaches or the school district expected B.L.’s
Snapchat post to create a substantial disruption.458 Nor did the post create a substantial
disruption.459 From the beginning, B.L.’s primary argument was that the school lacked the
authority to punish her for her off-campus speech.460
Responding to B.L., Mahanoy Area School District disagreed, arguing that Layshock,
Snyder, and Bethel were applicable only to suspensions from school.461 B.L. was suspended, not
from school, but from an extracurricular activity, and thus Layshock, Snyder, and Bethel were not
applicable to her case. 462 The school also argued that Bethel allowed the school to punish B.L. for
her off-campus speech if such speech was directed at the school community.463 B.L.’s speech was
directed at the school.464
After B.L. was granted a TRO and preliminary injunction, discovery was held, and both
parties then petitioned for summary judgment.465 Mahanoy petitioned for summary judgment,
arguing that its suspension did not violate B.L.’s First Amendment rights for four reasons.466 The
school argued that schools were allowed to punish students for off-campus speech.467 The issue
was not whether the schools could punish such speech but rather when.468 Next, the school argued
that students’ free speech rights should not substantially interfere with a school's educational
mission according to Tinker.469 Permitting B.L.’s behavior to go undisciplined permitted a
substantial disruption of the school’s educational mission.470 Because B.L. was suspended from an
extracurricular activity in which she did not have a protected property interest, there was no First
Amendment violation.471 Lastly, the school argued that Bethel did permit B.L. to be punished for
her off-campus speech.472 Failure to uphold the discipline meant that courts were sending an
“anything goes” message to students and undercutting administrators’ authority to exercise control
of the school environment.473
B.L. responded to the above arguments by continuing to assert that her suspension from
the cheerleading squad violated her First Amendment rights and arguing that Layshock, Snyder,
Tinker, and Bethel all held that it was unconstitutional for public schools to punish students for
profane or disrespectful social media posts created outside of school.474 She continued to argue
that Bethel and Tinker did not extend to off-campus speech.475 More importantly, it was her
position that Layshock, Snyder, Tinker, and Bethel rather than Kowalski controlled.476 While both
458
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parties agreed about the facts, B.L. kept insisting that the school misunderstood and
mischaracterized the applicable law.477
What was the misunderstanding? B.L.’s attorneys argued that Tinker did not allow schools
to punish off-campus speech absent a reason to anticipate that the speech would cause a substantial
or material disruption.478 Based upon these facts, B.L. could not be punished under Tinker as there
was neither a substantial nor material disruption caused by her conduct.479 No evidence existed to
demonstrate that the Cheerleading Rules used to punish B.L. served a valid educational purpose.480
If the rules did not have a pedagogical purpose sufficient to punish student speech under Tinker,
allowing such punishment would lead to totalitarianism.481 It was irrelevant to First Amendment
analysis as to whether B.L. had a protected property interest in the extracurricular activity;
Layshock and Snyder were not limited to school suspensions or expulsions.482 Lastly, the school’s
citation to and reliance upon Earls483 and Acton484 was misplaced.485 Earls and Acton were
decisions involving the Fourth rather than the First Amendment and were irrelevant to B.L.’486
B.L.’s arguments won, and she prevailed at the district court level, obtaining a TRO and
preliminary injunction; she also prevailed in her request for a summary judgment.487 From this
ruling, the school appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.488
Mahanoy Area School District’s Approach
Disappointed in the result, the school put forth five arguments in its Brief to the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, regarding the application of Tinker.489 It first argued that
the facts of Mahanoy were sufficiently different to be distinguishable from both Layshock and
Snyder.490 Since Layshock and Snyder involved a suspension from school rather than a suspension
from an extracurricular activity, these cases were inapplicable to B.L.’s case.491 The school’s
attorneys noted that Pennsylvania law distinguished between school and extracurricular activities
via statute which reinforced the school’s position that neither Snyder nor Layshock were applicable
to the Mahanoy facts since both of those decisions involved school suspensions rather than an
extracurricular activity suspension.492
Mahanoy then argued that schools must be permitted to teach and enforce socially
acceptable behavior for students.493 Enforcing extracurricular rules assisted schools with their
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educational mission as Tinker permitted.494 Lastly, Mahanoy noted that the district court’s
improper analysis meant that B.L.’s vulgar speech received the same level of protection as the pure
political speech of Tinker, which was not the intent of Tinker.495 The school explained that not all
speech is protected by the First Amendment.496 Unprotected categories of speech, e.g., content
regulation, included obscenity, fighting words, incitement, and defamation.497 The First
Amendment was never intended to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever
or wherever she pleases or to use any form of address that she chooses.498 Time, place, and manner
regulations, in addition to selected content regulations, were permitted.499 These reasons meant
that the school was entitled, under Tinker and Bethel, to punish B.L. for her vulgar, off-campus,
speech which was directed at the school.500
B.L. again responded to the school’s arguments, repeating her position that Layshock and
Snyder both governed, and that both prohibited public schools from “reaching beyond the
schoolyard”501 to “punish a student for expressive conduct that originates outside the school house,
did not disturb the school environment, and was not related to any school sponsored event.”502
Even if Tinker were applicable, which B.L. argued it was not, B.L.’s conduct caused no substantial
disruption.503 Again, B.L. reiterated that all of the cases cited by the school in its brief were
distinguishable from her facts.504
B.L. again prevailed505 with the majority of the United States Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, concluding that “Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech—that is, speech that is
outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as
bearing the school’s imprimatur.”506 Judge Ambro concurred in the court’s judgment but disagreed
with its reasoning, noting, “I dissent from the majority’s holding that, on the facts before us …
[that Tinker] … does not apply to 'off-campus’ speech.”507 He observed that the Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit was the first court to conclude categorically that Tinker did not apply to off-campus
student speech.508
Mahanoy then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a Writ of Certiorari.509
The school offered three arguments as to why the Court should grant certiorari, again reiterating
that a circuit split existed as to whether Tinker was applicable to off-campus student speech.510 It
next listed the numerous legal and practical consequences for students, parents, teachers, and
school administrators because of existing federal regulation regarding bullying and state legislation
494
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regarding harassment.511 This case provided an ideal vehicle for the Court to address these
recurring issues. Lastly, it argued that the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, simply
got the decision wrong.512 It failed to help schools grapple with the very real issue of handling offcampus student speech that migrated onto campus.513
B.L. responded to the petition, urging the Court to deny certiorari.514 First, she argued that
no circuit split existed.515 Why? Because the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit’s,
majority panel “held only that the First Amendment does not permit public school officials to
punish off-campus speech that: (1) does not constitute harassment or threat of violence; (2) took
place off-campus on a weekend outside of school hours; (3) was not disseminated through schoolowned, -operated, or -supervised channels or at a school event; and (4) did not bear the school's
imprimatur.”516 The school district treated “the decision below as simply applying an on-off switch
based on whether speech takes place on or off campus.”517 It misconstrued the decisions of other
circuit courts.518 Next, B.L. argued that this case was a “poor vehicle” for deciding whether Tinker
was applicable to off-campus speech because even if it was, B.L.’s conduct did not create a
substantial disruption as required by Tinker.519 Thus, Tinker was inapplicable.520 Lastly, B.L.
refuted the school’s argument that the Third Circuit’s decision was incorrect.521 She argued that
“[p]ermitting school officials to regulate student expression that occurs on a weekend, off-campus,
with no specific connection to the school would severely diminish students' free-speech rights in
the world at large.”522
The Court granted certiorari.523
Mahanoy then submitted its arguments to the Court in its brief.524 It argued that the First
Amendment did not bar schools from disciplining off-campus student speech that inflicted oncampus harms.525 Citing Noah Webster, Mahanoy argued that schools had been disciplining
disruptive off-campus speech since 1790.526 From 1790 through 1969, educators disciplined offcampus student speech that threatened on-campus student disruptions.527 Tinker continued to allow
this punishment but added the requirements of “substantial disruption” or “interference with the
rights of others.”528 Tinker did not disturb the settled principle that the constitutional rights of
students in the public school setting are not automatically co-extensive with the rights of adults in
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other settings.529 Part of a school’s job was to teach students the boundaries of socially acceptable
behavior so schools could establish rules of decorum in the school setting.530
Next, Mahony argued that Tinker offered students First Amendment speech protection.531
What protection was offered? The protection, said the school, is the “reasonably foreseeable”
test.532 Is it reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus speech will reach school and create a
substantial disruption?533 If so, students should then know that when their speech becomes
“school” speech, it is subject to punishment by the school.534 Mahanoy’s attorneys argued that the
purpose of Tinker’s substantial disruption test was to prevent schools from silencing student speech
with which the school disagreed.535 Schools must target the disruption caused by the speech rather
than the viewpoint of the speech expressed by the student.536
The school’s attorneys then argued that the holding of the Third Circuit would create chaos
with existing state law, federal law, and regulation.537 In every state, whether by state law or school
policy, schools regulate off-campus student speech that caused on-campus disruptions or interfered
with the rights of other students or school staff, e.g.., bullying or harassment.538 Federal law
required schools to protect their students’ on-campus learning environment, regardless of whether
the harassment originated inside or outside of the schoolhouse gate.539 To create a safe learning
environment, schools were required to address online messages.540 Why? Such messages created
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a permanent record that transient in-person conversations did not.541 The Third Circuit’s rule
would prevent schools from performing and protecting basic school operations.542
B.L. responded to the school’s brief with her own, making five arguments.543 She argued
that applying Tinker outside of school would seriously undermine the speech rights of students
because outside of school, students have a First Amendment right to be free from content-based
censorship.544 Why? Content based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. This
allows people, rather than the government, to decide what to say.545 Rather, Tinker is a narrow
exception to the First Amendment’s prohibition on content discrimination and is limited to the
school environment.546 Schools can regulate school speech, i.e., speech that takes place under
school supervision.547. Limiting Tinker to the school environment is sensible as it is too vague to
apply outside of school.548 It is an “unacceptable basis for regulating speech in the world at
large.”549 As in the court in Snyder v. Phelps550 said: “[We] must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.”551
B.L. then listed several examples of schools punishing student speech considered
inappropriate.552 After listing these examples, B.L. then asked whether schools should be able to
punish students for taking a photo and video of a crowded, mask-less school hallway and posting
it on Twitter to demonstrate that a school was not necessarily following the rules regarding social
distancing in the Covid-19 pandemic.553 Should students be forced to curtail what they say while
off-campus in the event that the school later deems the speech to be disruptive? These are the
problems, argued B.L., that would arise under by the school's standard.554
Because true threats, obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to
criminal conduct are not protected under the First Amendment,555 schools have the power to handle
harassment and bullying. Schools can also discipline students for aiding and abetting violations of
school regulations or conduct.556 There is no need to expand Tinker. 557
541
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B.L.’s brief next discussed closely related doctrines regarding teachers’ free speech rights
in public schools and the application of the Fourth Amendment in the public school setting.558 She
concluded that neither doctrine supported the school.559 Next, she asked how it was workable for
the school to claim that it would extend Tinker to off-campus speech that students intentionally
direct at the school environment that foreseeably reaches that environment.560 There would be no
limit to such a rule, resulting in both content and viewpoint discrimination.561
B.L.’s brief then acknowledged and responded to the arguments contained in the brief
submitted by the Solicitor General for the United States.562 Under the United States’ approach,
the vast majority of student speech outside the school environment would not be subjected to
Tinker.563 B.L. agreed with this approach but then noted that the government took the exact
opposite approach in her particular case.564 Such behavior was inconsistent with the principle that
the government was espousing.565 How, asked B.L., did this protect student speech?566
Lastly, B.L. argued that if the Court expanded Tinker to speech outside the school
environment, it should limit its application in that context and should require intent by students to
cause a substantial disruption to prevent the school district's broad interpretation of Tinker.567 Even
if the Court decided to apply Tinker to the facts of the case, B.L. argued that the school district had
violated her First Amendment rights as her speech failed to satisfy the “substantial” or “material”
disruption prong of Tinker. 568
The United States Solicitor General’s Approach
On March 1, 2021, the Acting Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court,
supporting the petitioner, Mahanoy Area School District.569 The Solicitor General framed the issue
facing the Court as “whether the First Amendment categorically prohibits its public-school
officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off-campus.”570 The United States
provided three reasons for its interest in the case.571 First, it noted that the federal government
operated hundreds of public schools, both primary and secondary, throughout its military
installations and Indian reservations.572 Several federal government agencies, including the
Department of Education, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health and Human
Services, also had an interest in this particular case as these departments provided significant
resources to address and prevent the bullying and harassment of students throughout the country.573
558
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Lastly, the government noted that it had a “substantial interest in the correct interpretation and
application of the federal constitution.”574
The Solicitor General made two arguments.575 The first argument stated that “the First
Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for
speech that occurs off-campus.”576 Next, it claimed that “off-campus student speech that threatens
the school community or intentionally targets certain individuals, groups or discrete school
functions may qualify as school speech potentially subject to discipline by school officials.”577
Under the first argument, the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.578 Why? Public schools prepare individuals for participation as citizens and teach them
the values upon which society rests.579 According to Bethel, a school may prohibit student speech
that “would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”580
Next, Solicitor General noted that a number of constitutional rights apply differently in the
public school setting.581 As an example, New Jersey v. TLO582 allowed Fourth Amendment
searches in public schools on the basis of “reasonable suspicion” rather than “probable cause.”583
Earls and Acton584 also allowed a lesser standard for student searches in the public school setting
while Goss v. Lopez585 permitted procedural due process to be satisfied with only “rudimentary
procedures.”586 The Solicitor General then stated: “The First Amendment is no exception.”587 It
cited Bethel, Morse, and Hazelwood, saying that “public schools may discipline students for
speech that otherwise would enjoy First Amendment protection if uttered by adults outside of the
school environment.”588
Readers of the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae brief were reminded that the “appropriate
question is whether and under what circumstances off-campus student speech may, consistent with
the First Amendment, be treated as ‘school speech’ and therefore potentially subject to discipline
by public school officials.”589 According to the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the
answer to the above question would turn on arbitrary distinctions such as whether the student
drafted the message on his or her computer or used the school's computer and whether the behavior
occurred a minute before the school bell rang or a minute afterward.590 This approach was likely
to create confusion rather than end it.591 This categorical approach could also undermine schools’
574
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efforts to respond to threats to the safety of their students and staff.592 Should schools “do nothing
and risk the safety of the school community or take action and risk a lawsuit?”593 This places
schools in a terrible position.594
Following the above approach, which is based on the student’s physical location when
drafting a message, would undermine a school’s efforts to combat harassment and bullying.595
Several provisions of federal and state law existed that were applicable to harassment and
bullying.596 Protecting students from harassing and bullying conduct was necessary to provide
students with the educational activities to which they were entitled.597
The second argument noted that “off-campus student speech that threatens the school
community or intentionally targets certain individuals, groups or discrete school functions may
qualify as school speech”598 that could be subject to discipline by school officials. Since “[s]peech
on public issues occupies the highest rung of hierarchy of First Amendment values,”599 it is entitled
to special protection. Speech that occurs off-campus but can properly be regarded as “school
speech” that is subject to discipline by school officials includes the following examples:
1. Speech that creates a threatening environment;
2. Speech that deprives other students of educational opportunities to which they are entitled
because of bullying or harassing behavior;
3. Speech that would undermine the essential functioning of the educational curriculum; or
4. Speech that would breach school security.600
The United States disagreed with the Mahanoy Area School District regarding the alleged
protection provided by Tinker to off-campus student speech.601 It noted that it wanted to protect
the rights of both the school and students.602 How could it accomplish that? It cited a decision from
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, McNeill v. Sherwood School District 88J.603
McNeill, said the Solicitor General, identified three relevant factors to be used to determine when
off-campus speech could be disciplined.604 It considered the following: “(1) the degree and
likelihood of harm to the school caused or augured by the speech; (2) whether it was reasonably
foreseeable that the speech would reach and impact the school; and (3) the relation between the
content and context of the speech and school.”605
Considering McNeill and Kowalski, the Solicitor General stated it was difficult to formulate
a single universal rule that captured the types of off-campus student speech that school officials
might properly regard as school speech that could be disciplined when warranted.606 Instead, a test
592
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was needed.607 What should the test be? The Solicitor General recommended that the following
categories of off-campus student speech could be identified as school speech, potentially subject
to discipline, if it was speech that:
1.

Threatens or reasonably can be regarded as threatening a school community;

2. Intentionally targets specific groups or individuals in the school community, i.e.,
identifiable students and teachers; or
3. Intentionally targets specific school functions or programs regarding matters essential to
or inherent in the functions or the programs themselves.608
The inquiry into the facts then becomes twofold: has the off-campus student speech become
“school speech?” If so, the speech is disciplined, the next question to ask is whether the discipline
violated the First Amendment.609
The Solicitor General then asked the Court to vacate the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.610
After submitting the brief, the Acting Solicitor General then filed a Motion for Leave to
Participate in Oral Arguments as Amicus Curiae and for divided argument on March 29, 2021.611
On April 5, 2021, the Court granted the Solicitor General's motion.612
The test proposed by the Solicitor General seemed to better protect both the students and
schools than either test suggested by Mahanoy or B.L. Mahanoy wanted to apply Tinker and Bethel
to off-campus student speech which would have substantially invaded much of students’ offcampus and after hours speech.613 B.L. insisted that Tinker was categorically inapplicable to offcampus student speech, ignoring the reality that threats, bullying, harassment, and cheating could
be created off-campus but still create a substantial disruption at the school.614 The Solicitor
General's suggested test provided a compromise between the two extreme approaches.
The Court’s Holding
After reading the parties’ briefs and appendices, reading the numerous amicus curiae briefs
submitted, and listening to oral arguments, the Court handed down its decision on June 23, 2021.615
It affirmed the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit’s, decision with an eight to one
ruling.616 Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the majority while Justice Alito drafted a
concurrence which Justice Gorsuch joined.617 Justice Thomas dissented.618 While the majority
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affirmed the Third Circuit’s judgment, it disagreed with its reasoning.619 Why? The Court
explained that it did not offer a rule to cover every possible student speech scenario.620 It said:
[W]e do not now set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment rule stating just
what counts as “off campus” speech and whether or how ordinary First Amendment
standards must give way off campus to a school's special need to prevent, e.g.,
substantial disruption of learning-related activities or the protection of those who
make up a school community.621
Instead, it provided three features of “off-campus speech, that often, though not always, distinguish
schools' efforts to regulate that speech from their efforts to regulate on-campus speech.”622 These
“features diminish the strength of the unique educational characteristics that might call for special
First Amendment leeway.”623 These three features are:
First, a school, in relation to off-campus speech, will rarely stand in loco parentis.
The doctrine of in loco parentis treats school administrators as standing in the place
of students’ parents under circumstances where the children’s actual parents cannot
protect, guide, and discipline them. Geographically speaking, off-campus speech
will normally fall within the zone of parental, rather than school-related,
responsibility.
Second, from the student speaker’s perspective, regulations of off-campus speech,
when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech, include all the speech a
student utters during the full 24-hour day. That means courts must be more skeptical
of a school's efforts to regulate off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the
student cannot engage in that kind of speech at all. When it comes to political or
religious speech that occurs outside school or a school program or activity, the
school will have a heavy burden to justify intervention.
Third, the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular
expression, especially when the expression takes place off campus. America’s
public schools are the nurseries of democracy. Our representative democracy only
works if we protect the “marketplace of ideas.” This free exchange facilitates an
informed public opinion, which, when transmitted to lawmakers, helps produce
laws that reflect the People’s will. 624
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IV.

Analysis: What Does It Mean?

Did the Court Get It Right?
The first question that comes to mind is why did the Court decide to hear this particular
case while refusing to hear earlier, arguably more meritorious cases, such as Layshock, Snyder and
Kowalski? What can be gleaned from the grant of certiorari for Mahanoy that was denied for
Layshock, Snyder, and Kowalski?
Could it be that the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, categorically said that
Tinker was inapplicable to all off-campus student speech? While the Court agreed with the Third
Circuit’s result, it did not agree with its reasoning.625 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that
there are circumstances in which Tinker still applies to off-campus student speech. Bullying,
harassment, threats, and cheating can all occur off-campus, but have on-campus implications that
must be handled by schools. The Court refused to let stand a decision that absolutely prohibited a
school from responding to any off-campus student speech.626
Instead, it acknowledged the perceived pettiness of Mahanoy’s punishment, concluding
that it could not be allowed.627 It upheld B.L.’s First Amendment rights in this particular case, but
it left room for a school to apply Tinker to off-campus student speech when appropriate.628 When
would such application be appropriate? The Court said three factors would be considered in the
future when deciding whether to apply Tinker to off-campus student speech.629 When the student
is not at school, there is a preference for the parent, rather than the school, to handle any needed
discipline of the student for behavior and speech.630 This follows the Court’s reasoning regarding
the allocation of power between parents and the State as announced in Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder.631
It also follows Blackstone’s Commentaries.632 Blackstone argued that the school stood in loco
parentis to the student when the child was at school.633 Since the child was no longer at school,
the school did not stand in loco parentis, and thus the responsibility for discipline, or lack thereof,
belonged to the parent rather than the school.634 No tiered scrutiny was announced, but the Court
said that it would be very “skeptical” of a school’s attempt to regulate off-campus student speech,
particularly speech of a political or religious nature.635 The Court would require a school to meet
a heavy burden when imposing punishment for off-campus speech.636 Lastly, it reminded schools
that part of their educational mission was to support students who engaged in unpopular
expressions and ideas.637
As Justice Breyer noted, there was “no rule” provided for which all of the parties seemed
to be clamoring.638 Why? If one reviews the decisions of the Court from 1968 onwards regarding
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student speech, it is clear that there is no unanimous agreement. There are majority opinions with
concurrences and dissents, but there are no unanimous opinions. Perhaps the Justices, along with
members of society, are unable to agree as to how students should behave off-campus and when
and how their conduct should be disciplined by parents. Discipline seems a very personal decision,
based upon individual and family values, that is best left to the parents.
What happens when a school disagrees with how a parent handles off-campus student
speech and discipline? Isn’t Mahanoy really about whose is the power to discipline rather than
whether Tinker was applicable to off-campus student speech? As this decision demonstrates, the
Court actually answered the second question rather than the first. Off-campus student speech may
be disciplined by schools only rarely, and schools will carry a heavy burden to justify interference
with the parental relationship and students’ First Amendment rights.639
What is the Court's Test or Analysis?
Reading the Court’s opinion, one can conclude that there are two tests: one for on-campus
speech and another for off-campus speech. For on-campus speech, the test remains as it was.640
Did the speech create a substantial or material disruption of the school or invade the rights of
others? If not, did the speech fit within one of the three categories below:
a.
b.
c.

Did the speech involve lewd and vulgar speech at the school?
Did the speech carry the imprimatur of the school?
Lastly did the speech promote illegal drug use at school or at a school
sanctioned event?641

If a school can answer “yes” to any of the above, it seems likely that punishment of the
student’s speech will be upheld.642 What does Mahanoy add to this analysis? It seems arguable
that Mahanoy stands for the proposition that in very limited and rare circumstances, off-campus
student speech can be regulated and disciplined. But three factors, i.e., the lack of the school’s in
loco parentis standing, the heavy burden the school must meet to satisfy a skeptical court, and a
school’s duty to protect unpopular ideas; all weigh heavily against upholding the constitutionality
of such discipline.
Does this lack of a rule for off-campus student speech create more confusion? Did
Mahanoy help schools? Lisa Blatt, attorney for the school, responded to the Court’s opinion, by
warning “that protecting student’s online speech would be ‘open season’ on schools and would
produce ‘chaos’ in the lower courts.”643
Is There a Better Test?
Using the Solicitor General’s position from both its brief and oral argument, it seems that
its approach provides more illumination to schools, parents, and students as to when students’ offcampus speech can be constitutionally disciplined by schools.644 Under the government’s
639
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approach, the analysis becomes twofold.645Two questions must be asked.646 The first is whether
the off-campus student speech has become school speech that can be regulated and disciplined by
the school.647 To answer this question, the following factors must be used:
a.

does the speech threaten or can it reasonably be regarded as threatening the school
community;

b.

does the speech intentionally target specific groups or individuals in the school
community; or

c.

does the speech intentionally target specific school functions or programs
regarding matters essential to or inherent in the functions or the programs
themselves?648

If the answer to any of the above is “yes,” then the students should expect that speech to qualify
as school speech that is potentially subject to discipline.649 The inquiry does not end here.650 Next,
it must be asked whether the disciplined school speech violated the First Amendment.651 To answer
that question, it must be asked whether the off-campus speech created a substantial disruption,
e.g., threats to the school or individuals within the school, cheating, or whether it impinged on the
rights of others, such as harassment of teachers or staff or the bullying of students.652 If the speech
involved threats, harassment, bullying, or cheating, even if off-campus, it seems likely that schools
can constitutionally discipline it.
Applying this test to the Mahanoy facts, one could argue that B.L.’s speech did indeed
target a specific school program, the cheerleading squad. Thus, she should have arguably
understood that if such speech reached the school’s administrator, it would be considered “school
speech.” But the second test must also be satisfied. Did B.L.’s speech create a substantial
disruption or impinge upon the rights of others? That answer seems to be “no.” While vulgar and
rude, B.L.’s post did not create a substantial disruption. Neither school routines nor classes were
disrupted by B.L.’s statement.653 It was, at best, thirty minutes of tittle tattle among students and
annoyed coaches. The school was not swamped or overrun with parents concerned for the safety
of their children. Some of the students were angry that B.L. was allowed to say such things and
get away with it, but this was by no means the substantial disruption that Tinker envisioned. Did
it impinge upon the rights of others? Were Coaches Luchetta-Rump and Gnall harassed or bullied?
Again, the answer seems to be “no.” While B.L. made her displeasure with the cheerleading squad
known, she did not single out or name the coaches or cheerleading squad members.654 Instead, she
expressed great frustration with her life.655 Did she express it inappropriately? Perhaps.
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Whose Is the Power?
Whose decision should it have been to punish B.L., her parents’ or the school’s?
Ultimately, this is the question that the Court answered.656 Following a line of cases that began in
the early twentieth century with Meyer, the Court concluded that the power usually belongs to the
parents rather than the school.657 The Court did leave room for exceptions to this, but it noted that
rarely would schools, no longer standing in loco parentis, be able to successfully punish offcampus student speech.658
Conclusion
Mahanoy became the fifth decision in the Court’s student speech cases. While some might
argue that it added little clarity to the existing student speech doctrine in the public school setting,
that is incorrect. An innocuous case, blown out of proportion, came before the Court, requiring it
to decide whether and when schools could constitutionally discipline off-campus student
speech.659 The Court left intact the Tinker analysis for the discipline of on-campus student speech
without adding to it or subtracting from it.660 It answered the question as to whether Tinker was
applicable, under any circumstances, to off-campus student speech.661 The answer was a very
qualified “yes,” with schools being required to satisfy a heavy burden to skeptical courts when
disciplining off-campus student speech.662 The lack of in loco parentis standing was a major factor
that mitigated against such punishment.663 Whose is the power to discipline? On the whole, the
Court says that power, when students are off-campus, primarily belong to the parents rather than
the schools.664 What happens when the school disagrees with a parent’s decision? That decision
apparently awaits another day. Did the Court indeed protect the “necessary” in B.L. or was it
“much ado about nothing”? Will B.L. be forever known as the “cursing cheerleader”? What
constitutes a “substantial disruption” or “interferes with the rights of others?” Mahanoy raises
many questions that have yet to be answered.
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